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Adam	Posen:	‘There	are	many	echoes	between
Brexiteers	and	the	Trump	way	of	thinking’
Adam	S.	Posen	has	worked	for	central	banks	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	–	the	US	Federal	Reserve	and	the
Bank	of	England	–	and	has	written	extensively	about	fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	Japan,	the	Eurozone	and	the
US.	Since	2013	Mr	Posen	has	been	the	president	of	the	think-tank	Peterson	Institute	for	International	Economics
(PIIE.)	He	is	currently	concerned	about	the	wave	of	anti-multilateralism	in	the	world,	fed	not	only,	in	his	view,	by
right-wing	populism,	but	coming	also	from	the	left,	as	represented	by	the	UK	Labour	Party	leader,	Jeremy
Corbyn,	and	Senator	Bernie	Sanders	in	the	US.	“You’ve	got	a	bunch	of	people	who	are	seeing	the	world	as	a
zero-sum	game,”	he	told	LSE	Business	Review	managing	editor	Helena	Vieira	before	his	talk	at	an	LSE	Financial
Markets	Group	event.
Could	you	define	multilateralism?
There’s	a	strict	definition	and	a	practical	one.	The	strict	definition	is	that	you	do	international	agreements	in	a	way
that’s	meant	to	be	rules-based	and	meant	not	to	be	individual	power	relationships	between	countries,	but	in
agreement	with	all	countries,	treating	them	equally.	So	in	some	ways,	the	idea	of	this	is,	as	attacked	as	it	is,	the
WTO,	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	where	if	there’s	going	to	be	a	new	agreement,	every	member	has	to	vote	for
it.	Everyone	is	treated	equally.
There’s	also	what	I’m	trying	to	talk	about	here	at	LSE,	which	is	also	part	of	a	more	practical	sort	of	spirit.	It’s	the
idea	that	maybe	you’re	not	doing	everything	universally	to	give	Burundi	a	veto	over	everything	the	US	and	the	EU
do,	but	that	you’re	trying	to	make	agreements	that	are	not	simply	treaties	between	the	most	powerful	states,	and
you’re	trying	to	engage	multiple	countries	at	once,	and	generally	a	commitment	to	rules-based	international	order
and	an	open	order.
On	both	these	counts	the	Trump	administration,	and	now	the	May	government	in	the	UK,	are	not	really	going
down	that	road.
We’ve	been	reading	about	the	decline	of	multilateralism	for	a	while	now,	so	it’s	not	a
recent	phenomenon.	What’s	behind	this	decline?
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I	think	the	issue	of	the	decline	versus	the	current	sort	of	anti-multilateralism	has	to	be	distinguished.	The	decline
was	that,	partly	in	late	Cold	War	and	partly	immediately	after	the	Cold	War,	there	were	a	lot	of	countries	that
really	wanted	to	be	part	of	the	global	market	system	or	various	other	agreements	that	were	not	trade	or	finance,
or	even	climate.	But	they	were	also	very	willing	to	take	US	leadership,	frankly.	And	under	both	Republican	and
Democratic	administrations,	to	varying	degrees,	but	never	violating	certain	norms,	there	was	a	sense	that	the
Americans	had	to	not	boss	people	around,	and	at	least	act	as	though	they	cared	about	fairness	and	rules	and
consistency.
What’	started	declining,	initially,	was	just	that	there	wasn’t	enough	energy	behind	that.	Again,	using	the	critical
example	of	trade,	there	was	a	great	sense	of	frustration,	not	just	in	the	US,	but	particularly	in	the	US	and	in
Europe,	that	during	the	last	few	rounds	of	trade	talks	meant	to	be	at	WTO	level,	Brazil	or	India	would	effectively
block	everything.	And	of	course	Brazil	and	India	were	understandably,	perhaps	not	justifiably,	but	understandably,
trying	to	make	up	for	ways	they	had	been	overlooked	and	cut	out	in	previous	decades.	And	so	for	the	best	bulk	of
people,	but	also	for	people	in	the	US,	there	was	kind	of	a	feeling,	‘why	are	we	bothering	with	this?”
But	I	think	the	decline	really	did	accelerate	in	recent	years,	and	that	is	because	we’ve	shifted	from	American
administrations,	British	administrations,	even	Chinese,	who	would	say,	‘I	still	want	to	hold	back,	I	still	want	to
aspire	to	try	to	do	something	multilateral.	If	we	do	something	plurilateral,	meaning,	multiple	countries	but	not
everyone	who	wants	to	be	open	to	other	countries,’	to	just	saying	‘Why	do	we	bother?	Actually	this	is	harmful.’
And	I	think	that’s	the	shift.
And	the	current	wave	of	right-wing	populism	is	exacerbating	things?
Absolutely.	I	think	it’s	interesting,	striking,	depressing,	pick	your	adjective,	that	there	are	so	many	echoes
between	the	Brexiteers	and	much	of	the	Trump	way	of	thinking	about	the	international	economy.
But	also	even	on	the	left.	I	mean,	I	think	the	left	ultimately	has	not	gotten	as	crazy	in	our	democracies	as	the
irresponsible	right	certainly	has	in	the	US.	But	you	can	see	it.	We’ve	just	had	the	Labour	Party	conference.
There’s	been	a	lot	of	discussion	from	Corbyn	and	people	around	him	of	the	left	critique	of	the	EU,	Lexit	as	it’s
sometimes	called,	and	in	the	US	of	course,	we	have	a	lot	of	people	associated	with	Senator	Bernie	Sanders	and
others	who	were	very	strongly	against	the	Trans	Pacific	Partnership	(TPP),	and	against	the	WTO.
That’s	what	I	mean	by	multilateralism	as	a	set	of	beliefs,	a	set	of	convictions,	not	so	much	strict	multilateralism.
You’ve	got	a	bunch	of	people	who	are	seeing	the	world	as	a	zero-sum	game,	particularly	the	world	economy	but
also	security	and	other	things,	and	who	very	explicitly	don’t	like	international	institutions,	don’t	like	international
rules.
Is	Britain	too	vulnerable	now?	Does	it	stand	a	chance	on	its	own?
It	certainly	stands	a	chance,	in	the	sense	of	existing	and	continuing	to	have	better	or	worse	growth.	Nothing	is
going	to	make	Britain	disappear.	But	there’s	no	sugar-coating	it.	There’s	nothing	good	in	economic	terms	about
Brexit.	And	as	many	people	know,	we’ve	just	see	the	breaking	news	that	the	Trump	administration,	reflecting	this
destructive	position	on	multilateral	trade,	used	unilateral	tariffs	on	Bombardier.
As	several	pundits	commented	on	Twitter:	“Good	thing	Theresa	May	had	that	handshake	agreement	with	her
best	buddy	agreeing	to	have	a	special	trade	relationship.”	At	the	same	time	this	will	potentially	put	thousands	out
of	work	in	Northern	Ireland.	I	mean,	if	Bombardier	had	lost	ground	for	business	reasons,	you	should	have	to	cope
with	it.	But	it’s	a	good	warning	that	the	US	is	not	going	to	be	doing	the	UK	any	favours.
So	you	don’t	see	any	chances	of	the	US	and	the	UK	striking	a	trade	deal?
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I	see	chances	of	them	doing	it,	but	I	see	chances	of	them	doing	it	as	a	very	symbolic	act	probably,	very	light	on
substance,	as	I’ve	said	a	few	times.	The	thing	is,	the	UK	is	a	80%+	service	economy,	the	US	is	almost	that	much
a	service	economy.	They	compete,	they’re	the	world	leaders	in	all	the	business	services,	finance,	insurance,	also
in	media	and	many	other	services.	So	a	trade	deal	between	the	two	of	them	is	actually	not	that	likely	to	expand
trade	that	much.	They’re	already	pretty	liberalised	in	those	areas	and	they’re	very	competitive	with	each	other.	So
I	think	a	shallow	trade	deal,	just	so	that	the	May	and	Trump	governments	can	say	“we	did	it	and	we	like	trade	with
rich,	white	people,”	rather	than	trade	with	the	rest	of	the	world	where	we’d	actually	bring	broader	benefits	but
more	adjustment.	It’s	entirely	possible,	but	I	just	don’t	think	it’s	going	to	be	very	meaningful.
Do	you	see	a	chance	the	EU	will	be	able	to	deepen	its	monetary	union	and	come	out
stronger	as	President	Macron	mentioned?
I	think	there’s	a	good	chance.	I	just	came	back	from	Brussels,	where	my	colleagues	at	the	Peterson	Institute	and	I
were	presenting	some	work	on	this	topic	to	the	DG	ECFIN,	the	economics	and	finance	group	at	the	Commission.
We	looked	carefully	at	US	history,	how	economic	and	monetary	integration	proceeded	in	the	US	over	the
19th	and	20th	centuries	to	try	to	distil	some	lessons	for	the	EU.	I	think	it’s	quite	doable.	I	think	to	his	credit
President	Macron,	and	to	a	less	degree	but	still	well,	President	Juncker,	a	couple	of	weeks	before,	outlined
visions	that	were	pro-European,	bringing	out	more	public	goods,	multilateral	within	the	European	context,	where
everyone	has	to	be	aboard.	And	I	have	to	hope	that	Germany,	despite	some	unfortunate	setbacks	in	the	election,
continues	to	see	its	vision	in	Europe,	and	I	think	that’s	right.	I	think	that	unlike	with	the	US	and	the	UK
governments,	there	are	lines	that	the	next	German	government	won’t	cross.
You	mentioned	the	WTO.	What’s	in	its	future?	A	weakened	position	in	the	world?	And
what	about	the	IMF,	the	World	Bank?
The	WTO	has	this	sort	of	low-level	equilibrium.	The	multilateral	trade	rounds,	like	the	so-called	Doha	Round,
were	stalled.	But	the	WTO	is	continuing	to	function	very	well	as	a	dispute	settlement	mechanism,	as	a	forum,	as	a
breeding	ground	for	trade	ideas	and	for	encouraging	higher	standards	and	fairer	trade.	It	is	very	much
multilateral.	And	that	was	sort	of	the	decline	of	multilateralism	in	trade,	a	decline	to	something	not	ideal,	but	very
useful.
The	fear	is	that	if	the	Trump	administration	pursues	unilateral	economic	policies	on	trade,	that	other	countries,
including	China	and	the	EU	will	take	the	US	to	the	WTO,	and	the	WTO	will	rule	against	the	US.	That’s	not	to	be
feared.	What	is	to	be	feared	is,	then,	the	Trump	administration	throwing	a	temper	tantrum	and	withdrawing	at	that
point.	And	that’s	potentially	very	destructive.	That	has	echoes	of	the	League	of	Nations	falling	apart	when	the
major	players,	including	the	US,	said	“well,	I	don’t	think	that	applies	to	me.”	So,	that’s	the	big	risk	in	the
background.
For	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank	I	remain	much	more	confident.	The	IMF	does	have	a	challenge:	their	very
aggressive	role,	but	not	control,	in	the	European	crisis,	and	the	provision	of	lots	of	resources	to	Greece,	not	to	the
degree	that	people	were	well	off,	but	by	comparison	to	other	bailouts,	very	large	resources.	That	means	they’ve
got	a	multilateral	problem.	They	seem	to	have	favoured	the	ones	who	are	members	over	the	others.	But	they
clearly	are	useful	in	terms	of	programmes	for	many	countries	around	the	world,	and	as	a	source	of	economic
expertise	and	as	a	coordinating	mechanism.
And	the	World	Bank,	I	think,	even	from	the	Trump	administration,	but	broadly,	has	a	lot	of	support	as	they’ve
defined	their	mission	to	be	about	global	public	goods,	such	as	public	health,	water,	women	in	the	workplace	and
in	economies,	education,	etc.	There	are	worries	there,	but	I’m	much	more	worried	about	the	trade	system	and	the
nascent,	but	not	yet	formed,	international	climate	regime,	which	may	get,	I	don’t	think	killed,	but	may	get	arrested
development.
The	Fed	has	just	announced	the	end	of	quantitative	easing,	and	economies	are	picking	up
in	the	US	and	Europe.	What	are	the	perspectives	for	the	next	few	years	in	Europe	and	the
US,	notwithstanding	Brexit	and	the	Trump	administration?
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It’s	easy	to	say	notwithstanding	Brexit.	It’s	hard	to	say	notwithstanding	the	Trump	administration.	They	are
taking	a	long	time	to	get	past	the	budget	in	the	US	and	as	a	result	they	haven’t	yet	had	the	effect	on	the	economy
many	have	thought	they	would.	If	they	pass	anything	close	to	the	major	tax	cuts	they’re	talking	about,	that	will	for
the	next	few	years	have	a	major	repercussion	on	the	world.	It’ll	unbalance	growth.	It	will	probably	lead	to	a	boom
and	a	bust	in	the	US,	in	the	classic	cycle.
But	broadly	speaking,	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England,	even	the	Bank	of	Japan,	are	sort	of	getting
back	to	normal	policy,	in	the	sense	that	their	decisions	are	not	life-and-death,	and	the	markets	are	not	going	to
swing	hugely	on	their	decisions,	whereas	recently,	a	year	or	two	ago,	if	one	of	the	central	banks	had	tightened
significantly	too	soon,	or	made	a	misstep,	it	could	have	had	very	big	repercussions.	There’s	still	room	for	the
Euro,	there’s	still	a	little	more	fragility	there,	as	reflected	in	the	weakness	continuing	in	Portugal	and	Greece,	and
the	massive	unemployment	in	parts	of	the	Euro	area,	but	even	there,	given	the	extremely	strong,	compared	to
potential,	and	very	broad	recovery	we’re	seeing	in	Europe	right	now,	I	think	even	the	ECB	is	just	getting	back	to
normal.	Central	banks	will	be	less	important	for	the	next	couple	of	years.
Adam	Posen	spoke	at	LSE	on	27	September	about	the	topic	“Multilateralism	under	Attack?	UK,	USA	and
the	others,”	an	event	organised	by	LSE’s	Financial	Markets	Group	(FMG).
This	interview	first	appeared	at	the	LSE	Business	Review.	
Featured	image	credit:	Provided	by	the	Peterson	Institute	of	International	Economics.	Not	under	a	Creative
Commons	licence.	
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	interviewee,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP–	American	Politics	and
Policy,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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